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RECENT CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - Venue
Statute Discrimination Against Foreign
Corporations
Defendant, a foreign insurance corporation licensed to do business in Texas, was sued in a county where it had a resident agent.
This county was not the county in which the cause of action arose,
nor where the company's principal place of business was located, nor
that in which plaintiff resided. Defendant appealed from the trial
court's order denying its plea of privilege to be sued in the county
of its principal place of business. The contention on appeal was
that the Texas venue statute, which permitted suit against foreign
corporations in any county where an agent resided but allowed suits
against domestic corporations in a narrower venue area, was unconstitutional as to foreign corporations as a denial of the equal
protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Held: Subdivision 27 of the venue
statute is unconstitutional in so far as it extends permissible limits
of venue against a foreign corporation in excess of the limits prescribed for domestic corporations. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 327 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
Since foreign corporations are not considered "citizens" within
the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause of the United
States Constitution,' states may impose reasonable restrictions upon
the right of a foreign corporation to do business within a state.'
Accordingly, a state may require the corporation to secure a license
to do business and deny the use of state courts to foreign corporations which fail to secure the requisite license. However, once
licensed to do business within the state, a foreign corporation is
entitled to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4 Equal protection
' Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). Although not "citizens"
under the privileges and immunities clause, they are considered "persons" under the
equal protection clause. Id. at 244; Edwards v. Leaver 102 F. Supp. 698 (D. R.I. 1952).
'Worchester Felt Pad Corp. v. Tucson Airport Authority, 233 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.
1956); Kentucky Straight Creek Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 247, 200 S.W.2d
470 (1947).
'Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
'Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926); Southern Ry. v. Greene,
216 U.S. 400 (1910); United States Borax & Chem. Corp. v. Carpentier, 14 Ill.2d 111,
150 N.E.2d 818 (1958).
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does not mean identical treatment with domestic corporations;' all
that is required is that any distinctions made in dealing with
foreign corporations as a class must be based on differences that bear
a reasonable relation to the classification imposed! Procedural statutes
are no exception," and as long as fundamental rights are protected,
states may permit foreign corporations to be sued in different forums
than those in which domestic corporations may be sued.' Moreover,
differences in venue between domestic and foreign corporations are
immaterial as long as the differences do not work injustice to either
type of corporation as a class.!
The Texas venue statute" provides that no suit may be brought
against a defendant other than in the county of his domicile unless
the action falls within one of the enumerated subdivisions." When
a defendant files a timely plea of privilege, the burden is on the
plaintiff to show the propriety of maintaining venue in the county
where the suit is then pending." This burden is met when the
plaintiff shows that the suit falls within one of the subdivision
exceptions in the venue statute." Until amended in 1943, foreign
and domestic corporations were subject to identical exceptions to
the basic venue rule that a corporation was to be sued in the county
where its principal office was situated. 4 These exceptions provided
that a corporation (foreign or domestic) " could be sued either in
the county where the cause of action arose or in any county where
an agent resided. 6 However, subdivision 23 was amended in 1943
to restrict suit against a domestic corporation to "the county
'Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Wheeling Steel Corp .v.
Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
'Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, supra note 5; Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400
(1910); Mims v. City of Ft. Worth, 61 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
' Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923). Venue
distinctions between individuals and corporations are generally held constitutional as a
reasonable classification where corporations may be sued in the county where the cause
of action arose, although the same venue setting is denied in suits against individuals.
Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499 (1931); Grayburg Oil Co. v. Powell, 118
Tex. 354, 15 S.W.2d 542 (1929).
'Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, supra note 7; accord, Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S.
362 (1930).
' Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 177 Okla. 539, 61 P.2d 184 (1936).
'°Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 1995 (1950).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995 subd. 23, 27 (1950)
(applying to domestic
and foreign corporations respectively).
"1I McDonald, Texas Civil Practice S 4.03 (1950).
13Id. at S 4.55.
14Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995 subd. 23, 27 (1950).
" Pittsburg Water Heater Co. v. Sullivan, 115 Tex. 417, 282 S.W. 576 (1926);
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Todd, 166 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). These
cases held that there is no distinction between foreign and domestic corporations as to
venue subdivisions.
6
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995 subd. 23, 27 (1950).
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in 'which plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action or part
thereof arose, provided such corporation . . . has an agency or
representative in such county; or, if . . .no agency or representative
in the county in which plaintiff resided . . .then ...in the county
nearest that in which plaintiff resided ...in which the corporation
.. .then had an agency. . . ."" Thus, the reference to the second
alternative, viz., suit in any county where an agent resided, was
deleted; therefore, venue against a domestic corporation was restricted geographically to the county of plaintiff's residence or the county
nearest in reference thereto."8 However, under subdivision 27, which
by its terms is applicable only to foreign corporations, suit may be
brought in any county where its agent resides.1" Another distinction
in classification between domestic and foreign corporations which
has arisen since the 1943 amendment lies in the necessity to prove
a cause of action as a venue fact."0 Although a cause of action must
always be alleged in a venue hearing," there have been many cases
since the 1943 amendment which have held that no cause of action
need be proved when venue is maintained against a foreign corporation under that part of subdivision 27 which permits suit to be
brought in a county where the corporation has a resident agent."
However, a cause of action must be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence in order to maintain venue against domestic corporations other than in the county of the corporation's principal
office."
The court in the principal case reasoned that since neither the
geographical limitation nor the requirement of proof of a cause of
action, applicable to domestic corporations, restricted a plaintiff
in a suit against a foreign corporation under subdivision 27, an
arbitrary classification existed against foreign corporations which
denied them equal protection of the laws." Other cases involving
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995 subd. 23, as amended, Acts 1943, 48th Leg.,
c.228, p. 1.
" Ibid.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1995 subd. 27 (1950); 1 McDonald, op. cit. supra
note 12, at § 4.30.
2I McDonald, op. cit. supra note 12, at 399.
"See Jefferies v. Dunklin, 131 Tex. 289, 115 S.W.2d 391 (1938); but see, Comment,
6 Sw. L.J. 258 (1952).
"Andretta
v. West, 318 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Centex
Paving Co. v. Underwood Oil Co., 314 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error dism.;
Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Ramsey 305 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Southwestern
Greyhound Lines v. Day, 238 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
" Lloyds Cas. Insurer v. McCrary, 149 Tex. 172, 229 S.W.2d 605 (1950); Victoria
Bank & Trust Co. v. Monteith 138 Tex. 216, 158 S.W.2d 63 (1941); Lanark Corp. v.
Conover, 321 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error dism.
'4 327 S.W.2d at 366, 367.
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geographical venue distinctions between domestic and foreign corporations (or corporations and individuals) have held there was
no denial of equal protection on the theory that equal protection
does not depend on a mere difference in venue forum but depends
on whether equal laws prevail in the forum which the state has
provided." However, in these cases venue was extended only to
one additional county,2 whereas, in the principal case the extention involved as many counties as there were agents. In the
principal case the court relied mainly on the reasoning of Power
Mfg. Co. v. Saunders," a decision which held an Arkansas venue
statute unconstitutional because suits against foreign corporations
could be filed in any county in the state at the plaintiff's discretion,
whereas, suits against domestic corporations had to be filed in a
county where the corporation had a place of business or in which
its chief officer resided. Although the principal case possibly does
not show geographic discrimination to as great an extent as Power
Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, any arbitrary discrimination is sufficient to
satisfy the test for a violation of the fourteenth amendment. 9
Moreover, the principal case is apparently the first decision concerning the issue of arbitrary discrimination because of a distinction
between foreign and domestic corporations in the necessity of
proving a cause of action. Defendant contended alternatively that
subdivision 27 had been impliedly amended to require the cause
of action and an agent to be in the same county as that where suit
is brought when a foreign corporation is sued outside the county of
its residence, thus, making the venue requirements the same for both
foreign and domestic corporations." This proposition was based
on a reading of the 1943 amendment in the light of article 1532
of the civil statutes and article 8.02 of the 1955 Business Corporation Act (which together state that foreign corporations shall
enjoy all the rights and privileges of domestic corporations but no
greater rights or privileges)." Necessary to this contention was the
premise, accepted by some writers in the field of venue, that subdivision 23 applied to both foreign and domestic corporations and
that subdivision 27 was merely an additional venue section for
2See

Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499 (1930); Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Snell,

193 U.S. 30 (1904).
26 Ibid.
2' 327 S.W.2d at 366, 367.
26274 U.S. 490 (1927).
2 See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S.
178

(1917).
20327 S.W.2d at 364.
31Ibid.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

foreign corporations. 2 The court correctly determined that this
premise was deducted from dicta in several cases,3 and therefore
subdivision 23 applied to domestic corporations alone.3 '
No reasonable distinction can be made between foreign and
domestic corporations on which to base an almost unlimited geographic distinction in venue requirements, and the variance in the
proof of the cause of action is an even more fundamental right
which alone would probably be classed as an arbitrary discrimination.
Therefore, based on the principle set forth in Power Mfg. Co. v.
Saunders, it would seem that the decision in the principal case is
clearly correct. This raises the question, however, of where foreign
corporations can be sued after this decision. The court clearly declared
subdivision 27 unconstitutional only to the extent it conflicts with
subdivision 23. Therefore, it would seem that foreign corporations
can be sued in the county where the cause of action arose, where it
has its principal office, or if there is no agent or representative in the
state, in the county where the plaintiff resides. Thus, suits against
foreign corporations are still authorized in substantially the same
counties as suits against domestic corporations, and it appears that
plaintiffs will not suffer from lack of forums in which to sue a foreign
corporation. Now, however, possible discrimination appears against
domestic corporations when suit is sought in the county of plaintiff's residence. Domestic corporations may be sued in the plaintiff's county of residence if an agent resides there, whereas foreign
corporations may be sued in plaintiff's county of residence only if
the cause of action arose there or if the corporation is totally unrepresented in the state. To alleviate the discrimination it seems that
the only practical solution is legislative action giving foreign and
domestic corporations identical treatment under the venue statute.
James L. Collins

Evidence-Judicial Notice-Radar
Defendant was convicted of violating maximum speed laws. The
basis of the conviction was a radar unit reading with respect to his
speed. There was testimony that the radar unit had been set up and
tested, but there was no evidence of the results of the test. Held:
Where a conviction for speeding rests upon the reading of a radar
" I McDonald, op. cit. supra note 12.
3 327 S.W.2d at 366.
34 Ibid.
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unit, failure to prove the accuracy of that radar unit on location
is reversible error. Wilson v. State, -Tex. Crim.-_, 328 S.W.2d 311
(1959).
The doctrine of judicial notice recognizes that certain facts may
be so notorious or their existence so easily ascertained that proof of
such will not be required.' While there is strong authority to the
contrary,' the majority of jurisdictions support the view that when
judicial notice of a fact is taken, evidence to the contrary is inadmissible, and the judge is required to instruct the jury that the fact is to
be accepted as true.3 Judicial notice usually will be taken of scientific
facts either notoriously true or capable of demonstration by authoritative sources.4 Courts have judicially noticed certain scientific facts,
e.g., the results of blood grouping tests in questions of paternity,' Xray photographs,' fingerprints,' speedometer readings,' disc recordings,' the arching propensity of electricity, 0 the intoxicating character
of various beverages, 1 the liquid character of alcohol and ether at ordinary room temperatures,"a and certain passages in recognized books."
Some courts, however, have refused to take judicial notice of such
'Miller v. Texas N.O.R.R., 83 Tex. 518, 18 S.W. 954 (1892); 1 McCormick & Ray,
Texas Law of Evidence § 151 (2d ed. 1956).
'Ohio Bell Tel. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937) (dictum in opinion
by Cardozo, J.); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (dictum in opinion by L. Hand, J.); See also Thayer, Evidence 308-09 (1898);
9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2567 (3d ed. 1940).
'Lane v. Sargent, 217 Fed. 237 (Ist Cir. 1914); People v. Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 45
Pac. 860 (1896); State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37 Atl. 80 (1897); State ex rel. Landis
v. Thompson, 121 Fla. 561, 164 So. 192 (1935); Commonwealth v. Marzynski, 149 Mass.
68, 21 N.E. 228 (1889); State v. Cromwell, 6 N.J. Misc. 221, 140 Atl. 429 (Sup. Ct.
1928).
'Cantrell v. Board of Sup'rs, 87 Cal. App. 2d 471, 197 P.2d 218 (1948); Roberts
v. Wofford Beach Hotel, 67 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1953); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243
N.C. 355, 90 S.E. 2d 754 (1956); Kennedy v. General Geophysical Co., 213 S.W.2d
707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
5Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949) (accepted to disprove paternity,
but not to prove it); Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (Super. Ct.
1950) (accepted to disprove paternity, but not to prove it).
6Prescott & N. W. R.R. v. Franks, 111 Ark. 83, 163 S.W. 180 (1914); Texas
Employers Ins. Ass'n. v. Crow, 148 Tex. 113, 221 S.W.2d 235 (1949); Houston &
T. C. R.R. v. Shapard, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 596, 118 S.W. 596 (1909), error ref.
'People v. Jennings, 252 I1. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911); State v. Cerciello, 86 N.J.L.
309, 90 Atl. 1112 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914).
'People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954); City of
Spokane v. Knight, 96 Wash. 403, 165 Pac. 105 (1917).
'Gotthelf v. Hillcrest Lumber Co., 280 App. Div. 668, 116 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1952).
" Pasco v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 254, 227 P.2d 555 (1951).
" Skaggs v. State,
-_Okla. Crim.___, 276 P.2d 267 (1954) (gin); Latta v. State,
19 Okla. Crim. 441, 200 Pac. 551 (1921) (whiskey); Cox v. State, 3 Okla. Crim. 129,
104 Pac. 1074, 105 Pac. 369 (1909) (beer).
"Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Bostwick Lab., 181 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1950).
"3Application of Norris, 179 F.2d 970 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (quotation from chemical
textbook authority); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Rochester, 281 S.W. 306 (Tex.
Civ. App.), aff'd, 115 Tex. 404, 283 S.W. 135 (1926) (on the subject of electricity).
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facts, holding them admissible to be considered by the fact finder
in determining the particular issue if (1) the scientific apparatus
producing the facts is accepted as dependable in the field of science
involved; (2) the particular apparatus used is in good condition for
accurate work; and (3) the witness using the apparatus as the source
of his testimony is qualified for its use by training and experience."
Most courts are in agreement that certain scientific facts, e.g., the
results of lie detector tests15 and sodium pentothal" (truth serum)
tests, not only will be denied judicial notice, but will not be admitted
into evidence, reasoning that the reliability of such tests is not established with a sufficient degree of accuracy in the particular field of
science."
The early cases on radar speedmeters refused to take judicial notice
of their readings,'" but admitted them in evidence upon proof of
(1) the accuracy of the general principles of radar by expert testimony, (2) the particular unit's accuracy at the time in question,
and (3) the qualifications to operate the unit of the witness seeking
to testify as to the reading of the unit regarding the defendant's
speed.' " The courts began to modify their requirements with the New
Jersey decision of State v. Dantonio," where the court stated that

there would be no need for expert testimony as to the accuracy
of the scientific principles of radar if the particular unit in question
were properly set up and tested by the police officers in charge. Subsequently, New York" and Nebraska" courts followed the same
reasoning. However, for the first time in People v. Magri," the courts
completed the change in their requirements by giving express recognition to the applicability of the doctrine of judicial notice to radar
readings. The present rule is that the results of radar will be judicially
'" Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof 450 (3d ed. 1937).
"Davis v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 456, 308 S.W.2d 880 (1958); Stockwell v. State,
164 Tex. Crim. 656, 301 S.W.2d 669 (1957); Peterson v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 255,
247 S.W.2d 110, 248 S.W.2d 130 (1952). See also Notes, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 880 (1959).
"Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956); People v. McNichol, 100
Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P.2d 21 (1950); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d
495 (1951).
1Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
"People v. Beck, 205 Misc. 757, 130 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Cc. 1954); People v.
Offermann, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
"State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. 210, 100 A.2d 778 (1953); People v. Torpey, 204 Misc.
1023, 128 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Monroe County Ct. 1953); People v. Katz, 205 Misc. 522, 129
N.Y.S.2d 8 (Ct. Spec. Sess.1954); People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Ct.
Spec. Sess. 1954); Hardaway v. State, 202 Tenn. 94, 302 S.W.2d 351 (1957).
20 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955).
"People v. Nasella, 3 Misc. 2d 418, 155 N.Y.S.2d 463 (New York City Ct. 1956);
People v. Sachs, 1 Misc. 2d 148, 147 N.Y.S.2d 801 (New York City Ct. 1955).
22Peterson v. State, 163 Neb. 669, 80 N.W.2d 688 (1957); Dietz v. State, 162 Neb.
80, 75 N.W.2d 95 (1956).
233 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958).
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noticed if it is established that the particular unit in question was
accurate and was properly operated at the time the defendant's
speed was recorded.'
The court's holding in the principal case is sound; for radar readings to be admitted in evidence or judicially noticed, the particular
unit must be proven accurate."' A conviction based on the readings
of a unit, the accuracy of which has not been established, will require reversal."6 Although the principal case does not reach the
issue of judicial notice, the court does indicate that the results of
radar will be judicially noticed as true if there is proof of the accuracy of the unit in question and that the unit was operated by
one qualified by training and experience.' If this is true, Texas will
be in accord with the majority of other jurisdictions which have
considered the problem."
"4United States v. Dreos, 156 F. Supp. 200 (D. Md. 1957); Everight v. City of Little
Rock, -- Ark.-., 326 S.W.2d 796 (1959); State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959); People v. Dusing, 5 N.Y.2d 126, 155 N.E.2d 393, 181 N.Y.2d 493 (1959);
People v. Duskin, 11 Misc. 2d 945, 174 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Nassau County Ct. 1958); People v.
Wylie, 13 Misc. 2d 310, 179 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Niagara County Ct. 1958); People v. Jones, 10
Misc. 2d 1067, 171 N.Y.S.2d 325 (New York City Ct. 1958); City of E. Cleveland v.
Ferell, 168 Ohio St, 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958). Note also that some states have taken
a different approach to the evidentiary effect of radar readings by enacting statutes providing for the radar unit's readings to be taken as prima facie evidence of the defendant's
speed. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 431, § 113-A (1958); Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 91
(1953); N.D. Rev. Code § 0315 (1955); Va. Code Ann. S 46.1-198 (1950); W. Va.
Code Ann. § 1721 (338a) (1957).
"People v. Charles, 15 Misc. 2d 401, 180 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Orange County Ct. 1958);
Kopper, Symposium: Radar Speedmeters The Scientific Reliability of Radar Speedmeters, 16 Md. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1956). But note that the mere fact that the test is made
by a person not skilled in electronics is not of sufficient import to render the evidence
inadmissible. State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. 210, 100 A.2d 778 (1953).
26Royals v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 876, 96 S.E.2d 812 (1957). All convictions to
date have been based on a showing of the particular unit's accuracy. See, e.g., State v.
Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955); People v. Wylie, 13 Misc. 2d 310, 179
N.Y.S.2d 901 (Niagara County Ct. 1958); People v. Katz, 205 Misc. 522, 129 N.Y.S.2d
8 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954); People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Ct. Spec.
Sess. 1954).
27 328 S.W.2d 311, at 313. The issues of accuracy of the unit and operation by
one
qualified by training and experience may be fact questions to be decided by the jury.
Upon establishment of these two factors the radar readings, generally, will be conclusive
on the issue of the defendant's speed. Everight v. City of Little Rock,
Ark.,
326 S.W.2d 796 (1959); State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. 210, 100 A.2d 778 (1953); People v.
Dusing, 5 N.Y.2d 126, 155 N.E.2d 393, 181 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1959); People v. Wylie, 13
Misc. 2d 310, 179 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Niagara County Ct. 1958); People v. Katz, 205 Misc.
522, 129 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954); People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, 129
N.Y.S.2d 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954); People v. Jones, 10 Misc. 2d 1067, 171 N.Y.S.2d 325
(New York City Ct. 1958); People v. Nasella, 3 Misc. 2d 418, 155 N.Y.S.2d 463 (New
York City Ct. 1956); People v. Sachs, I Misc. 2d 148, 147 N.Y.S.2d 801 (New York
City Ct. 1955). Contra: State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955); State
v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Hardaway v. State, 202 Tenn. 94,
302 S.W.2d 351 (1957).
28 United States v. Dreos, 156 F. Supp. 200 (D. Md. 1957); Everight
v. City of
Little Rock, --- Ark-,
326 S.W.2d 796 (1959); State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188
(Mo. Ct. App. 1959); People v. Dusing, 5 N.Y.2d 126, 155 N.E.2d 393, 181 N.Y.S.2d
493 (1959); People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958);
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The prevailing authority," accepting the view that radar readings
should be accorded judicial notice, will expedite trials by doing away
with the necessity of proving the accuracy of the general principles
of radar in every case. Moreover, the defendant will still be accorded sufficient protection since he may prevent judicial notice
by showing that the particular instrument in question was inaccurate or that the operator of the unit was inexperienced. With
over five hundred police departments in forty-three states utilizing
radar to aid in law enforcement"0 and the increasing number of
automobiles and super-highways across the nation, such a result
is a desirable and progressive step forward in the law.
Jay Ungerman

Fire Insurance

-

Measure of Recovery and Partial Losses

Depreciation

Plaintiff procured from Defendant a Texas Standard Policy of
Insurance, insuring his house against loss by fire and additional
named perils including windstorm and hail. The policy provided
that the insurer's liability should not exceed (1) the actual cash
value of the property at time of loss ascertained with proper deduction for depreciation, nor (2) the cost to repair or replace the
property with material of "like kind and quality" within a reasonable time after loss.' Plaintiff's roof was partially damaged, allegedly
by windstorm, hail, and rain. In a suit by Plaintiff to recover the
full cost of repairs, Defendant contended that the replacement
cost of any damaged property should be subject to a depreciation
charge under the terms of the policy. Held: Under a Texas Standard Fire Policy of Insurance an insured is entitled to recover the
full cost of repair for a partial loss without a deduction for dePeople v. Duskin, 11 Misc. 2d 945, 174 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Nassau County Ct. 1958); People
v. Wylie, 13 Misc. 2d 310, 179 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Niagara County Ct. 1958); People v.
Jones, 10 Misc. 2d 1067, 171 N.Y.S.2d 325 (New York City Ct. 1958); City of E.
Cleveland v. Ferell, 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958).
" Ibid.
'"Comment, 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 784 (1955).
" Subject to article 6.13 of the Texas Insurance Code, 1951, liability hereunder shall
not exceed the actual cash value of the property at the time of loss, ascertained with proper
deduction for depreciation; nor shall it exceed the amount it would cost to repair or replace
the property with material of like kind and quality within a reasonable time after the loss,
without allowance for any increased cost of repair or reconstruction by reason of any
ordinance or law regulating construction or repair, and without compensation for loss resulting from interruption of business or manufacture; nor shall it exceed the interest of the
insured, or the specific amounts shown under 'amount of insurance.' "
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preciation even though the damage can be repaired only by use
of new materials. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 330 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959).
Generally, a fire insurance contract is one of indemnity,' and the
form of each policy is prescribed by statute.' The measure of recovery, according to the terms of most policies,' is the "actual cash
value" of the property destroyed.' "Actual cash value" is not an
absolute term, but varies with the nature of the loss and the surrounding circumstances.' As applied to personalty, "market value"
is usually of primal importance in ascertaining "actual cash value,"'
although the two terms are not necessarily synonymous.' Computation of the "actual cash value" of buildings, on the other hand,
usually begins with replacement cost.' Typically, a building is sold
either in connection with land or to be removed from land.'" Since
land is an uninsured factor and the market value of a building sold
for removal is usually far below its real or intrinsic value, market
value is rarely conclusive evidence of the "actual cash value" of
buildings." Where total loss is involved, the established principle
is that "actual cash value" is replacement cost at the time of loss
minus actual physical depreciation." Moreover, several cases have
held that obsolescence," inability to use the property,"' and similar
factors should also be taken into consideration. These cases emphasize that every fact and circumstance which would logically aid a
correct estimate of the loss, including the economic value of the
property, should be considered in determining "actual cash value.""
There is a conflict of authority as to the proper measure of re2 Bonbright & Katz, Valuation of Property to Measure Fire Insurance Losses, 29 Colum.
L. Rev. 857 (1929). An exception is the valued policy under which the measure of recovery
is the valuation stated in the policy.
a ' Bonbright, Valuation of Property 362, 367 (1937).
"There are 48 jurisdictions, including Texas, which follow the 1943 New York Standard
Form.
' Bonbright, op. cit. supra note 3, at 368. Although the New England form, followed
by Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Minnesota simply refers to "actual value," the
courts do not appear to have made any distinction in interpreting the two terms. Kingsley
v. Spofford, 298 Mass. 469, 11 N.E.2d 487 (1937).
'National-Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Short, 207 Oki. 673, 252 P.2d 495 (1953).
"Texas Moline Plow Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 87 S.W. 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905)
error ref.
'Southern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wood, 133 S.W. 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
'Goldin, Principles of the New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy 67 (1938).
55
Britven v. Occidental Ins. Co., 234 Iowa 682, 13 N.W.2d 791, 793 (1944).
"Ibid.
is Bonbright & Katz, supra note 2. A loss is said to be total when there is left standing
no portion which a prudent man, uninsured, would use as the basis for restoration.
"McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928).
"'Board of Educ. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 163, 19 S.E.2d 448 (1942).
55
McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928).
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covery when the loss is partial. The "actual cash value" of the part
destroyed, historically, has been measured by either the cost of repairs minus depreciation,' " or the difference between the value immediately before the damage and the value immediately thereafter. 7
In many cases, the effect of the difference-in-value rule has been
virtually the same as that of the cost-of-repair rule since cost of
repair is often the best evidence of the difference in value." Probably the most significant development in the partial loss cases
has been the emergence of the view that the measure of recovery
may be the cost of repairs without any depreciation allowance."
The first case expressing this position was Fedas v. Insurance Co."
The Fedas case was followed by a Montana decision, McIntosh v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co.," in which the court refused to allow a depreciation charge, thereby awarding the insured the full cost of
repairs with new material. Although the court in McIntosh quoted
extensively from Fedas, its decision was based primarily upon a
statute 2 which was interpreted as prohibiting any deduction for depreciation. However, even in the absence of statutory provisions,
several later cases have followed the Fedas and McIntosh decisions."
Court divergence regarding depreciation, as applied to partial losses,
stems both from differing concepts of indemnity and from differing
interpretations as to the effect of the repair clause of the liability
provision, (". . . nor shall it exceed the amount it would cost to
repair or replace the property with material of like kind and quality
within a reasonable time after the loss . . ."). The cases which permit the deduction of depreciation regard the repair clause as a limitation upon the amount which may be recovered rather than as an
independent and controlling measure of damages.' 4 These cases
reason that inasmuch as the fire insurance contract is one of indem1"See Smith v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co., 219 Il1. App. 506 (1920).

"TSee Citizens Ins. Co. v. Foxbilt, Inc., 226 F.2d 641, 644 (8th Cir. 1955); Voges v.
Mechanics Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 553, 230 N.W. 105 (1930).
6
" Note, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 818 (1949).
19Ibid.
20300 Pa. 555, 151 Atl. 285 (1930).
106 Mont. 434, 78 P.2d 82 (1938).
"2Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 8157 (1921): "If there is no valuation in the policy,
the measure of indemnity in an insurance against fire is the expense, at the time the loss
is payable of replacing the thing lost or injured, in the condition in which it was at the
time of the injury ..
" This section is now found in § 40-904 (1947).
"aGlens Falls Co. v. Gulf Breeze Cottage, Inc., 211 La. 765, 38 So. 2d 828 (1949);
Third Nat'l Bank v. American Equitable Ins. Co., 27 Tenn. App. 249, 178 S.W.2d 915
(1943).
'McAnarney
v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928); Citizens
Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 86 Vt. 267, 84 Atl. 970, 972
(1912).
2'
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nity, the insured should incur neither economic gain nor harm
from the loss. Therefore, a deduction for depreciation is necessary
to prevent the insured from deriving benefit from a loss." On
the other hand, the cases adhering to the opposite view regard
the clause as a substantive measure of recovery, reasoning that if depreciation is deducted from the cost of repairs, the sum recovered will
be insufficient to allow completion of the repairs, and hence will not

furnish the indemnity contracted for in the policy." This view has
been reinforced in some cases" by applying the rule of construction
that a contract is to be construed most strongly against the one who
prepared it."s
The instant case, one of first impression in Texas, follows the
Fedas line of decisions. The first and second clauses of the liability
provision were construed as being disjunctive-the first clause to be
applied to total and the second clause to partial losses. 9 Although
the court did not specifically so hold, it seems apparent that it
construed "materials of like kind and quality" to relate to quality
and suitableness or fitness for purpose used rather than as referring to
parts of like age, use, and condition." The court adopted the
rationale of Third Nat'l Bank v. American Equitable Ins. Co.,2 ' viz.,
that a depreciation deduction from the cost of repairs reduces the
recovery to an amount insufficient to complete the repairs, thereby

falling short of the indemnity required by the policy. The court
refused to accept the analogy, suggested by Defendant, between the
liability provision in automobile collision policies" and the provision at
issue in the principal case. The Texas courts have interpreted the
automobile insurance liability provision to require consideration
of the depreciation element. Since both of the provisions apply to
property coverage, and since the rationale of the instant case seems

to be based on the indemnity principle underlying the contract
a See authorities note 24 supra.
Falls Co. v. Gulf Breeze Cottage, Inc., 211 La. 765, 38 So. 2d 828 (1949);

2"Glens

Fedas v. Ins. Co., 300 Pa. 555, 111 Ati. 285 (1930); Third Nat'l Bank v. American
Equitable Ins. Co., 27 Tenn. App. 249, 178 S.W.2d 915 (1943).
"'Farber v. Perkiomen Mut. Ins. Co., 370 Pa. 480, 88 A.2d 776 (1952).
2 Apparently ignoring the fact that the state legislatures, not the insurer, prescribe the
form of the standard fire insurance policy.
9
" But see Voges v. Mechanics Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 553, 555, 230 N.W. 105, 107 (1930).
20 The few cases which have construed this phrase have made similar constructions. See
North River Ins. Co. v. Godley, 55 Ga. App. 52, 189 S.E. 577 (1936); cf. Maryland
Motor Car Ins. Co. v. Smith, 254 S.W. 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
s 27 Tenn. App. 249, 178 S.W.2d 915 (1943).
". ... shall in no event exceed what it would then cost to repair or replace . . . with
others
of the like kind and quality .. "
5
sRoberdeau v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. Am., 231 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)
error ref. n.r.e.
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rather than on its specific wording, the analogy would appear to be
pertinent. It would seem that the same theory of indemnity should
be applicable to all partial property losses.
The basic conflict in this area is rooted in differing concepts of
indemnity. Courts which construe the repair clause as a substantive
measure of damages view indemnity as the replacement of an asset
to its prior use value; whereas, the construction that the repair clause
is only a limitation on recovery is grounded in a conception of indemnity as compensation for the loss of an asset as an item of objectively determinable value. The latter construction seems more preferable; first, because the use of the words "not to exceed" implies
that the measure of damages is not necessarily synonymous with the
cost of repairs; and secondly, because the clause appears in a provision
which is otherwise solely devoted to limiting the liability of the
insurance company. Probably the real problem is the effort of the
courts to formulate an absolute rule, for even though both rules
may be logical in certain situations, it is questionable whether either
would result in true indemnity under all circumstances. Assume, for
example, that a building with an actual cash value of $10,000 is
almost totally destroyed and that, because of the high cost of labor
and material, it would cost $15,000 to repair the building. Since "to
indemnify" means that the insured should incur neither gain nor loss,
a refusal to deduct depreciation would more than indemnify the
insured since it would place him in a better economic position than
before the fire. Moreover, it would result in the anomaly of the insured's being able to recover more for a partial loss than he could
for a total one. On the other hand, assume that the repairing involves
only the replacement of a few floor boards. A deduction for depreciation would leave the insured with an amount insufficient to repair the
damage, and in these circumstances there is no countervailing consideration that recovery of the full cost of repair would put the insured
in a better position than he was before the loss. Perhaps, in this situation, a refusal to allow depreciation would more nearly result in
true indemnity. It would seem that a more flexible rule requiring depreciation deduction, if the repair would place the insured in a better
position but denying such deduction if the repair merely places the
insured in the same position that he was in before the loss, would
be preferable. Such a rule would not do violence to the terms of the
contract, for the recovery would never exceed the cost to repair with
materials of like kind and quality. If the insured desires more exten-
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sive coverage,
he has the privilege of purchasing replacement in4
surance.

Earldean V. S. Robbins
Labor Law - Arbitration and Award - Arbitrator's
Power To Make Remedial Order
The Company, over protests of the Union, assigned the wrong
employee to do overtime work. Subsequently, the Company admitted its error but, despite the insistence of the Union, refused to
pay the employee who had been deprived of overtime for the time
he should have been allowed to work. The steps of the grievance
procedure were pursued to arbitration, with the result that the
Company offered "make-work" overtime for the aggrieved employee, but asserted a policy of paying only for work performed.!
The Union asked for arbitration under a contract clause providing
for the arbitration of "differences relating to the interpretation or
performance" of the agreement. The agreement did not contain an

express provision conferring authority on the arbitrator to prescribe remedies for violations. Moreover, under the contract the
Union reserved a conditional right to strike. The conditions were
full compliance with the grievance procedure, 60-day notice thereafter of intention to strike, and approval of the proposed strike
by the union membership by a secret vote. The Company agreed to
arbitrate the question of violation, but refused to arbitrate the
question of the appropriate remedy, contending that in the absence of a specific contractual provision the arbitrator could have
no power to override the Company's policy. Subsequently, the Union
sued for specific performance of the arbitration provision, contending that under the general arbitration clause the Company was
under a duty to arbitrate both the violation and the appropriate
remedy. Held: Where a collective bargaining agreement provides
for arbitration of differences over performance and interpretation of
the contract without mention of remedies for violation, but leaves
the union a qualified right to strike, authority of the arbitrator to
award damages will not be implied if such remedy would contra4 Replacement insurance will also pay the difference between indemnity received for
the loss or damage to the old building and the cost of rebuilding or repairing with new
materials. Texas Physical Loss Form No. 148-A.
'Although the company had apparently pursued the policy previously, it is not clear
from the decision whether the company had clearly enunciated the policy before the
dispute in question.
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vene a management policy. Refinery Employees Union v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959).
At common law, agreements to arbitrate future disputes were
classified as attempts to deprive the courts of jurisdiction and therefore were not specifically enforceable.! However, once a dispute
had gone to arbitration and an award had been made, the parties
were held to be bound by it.' In 1925 the United States Arbitration
Act reversed this approach and provided for enforcement of prospective arbitration contracts in federal courts.' However, that act
expressly excludes contracts of employment from its provisions
Section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides for suits by and
against labor organizations to enforce collective bargaining contracts in a federal district court without regard to the amount in
controversy or diversity of citizenship.' Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills' was the first case to decide that executory contracts to
arbitrate disputes arising out of collective bargaining agreements
are specifically enforceable in the federal courts under section 301.6
The purpose of this decision was to enforce the congressional policy
of giving sanctions to agreements to arbitrate labor disputes! Accordingly, a union is given standing to enforce the arbitration
clause of a contract against a company even though the employees
as individuals may receive the ultimate benefits." It follows that
'Oskaloosa

Say. Bank v. Mahaska County State Bank, 205 Iowa 1351,

219

N.W.

530 (1928).
3 Ibid.
443 Stat. 883 (1925)
(now 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1947)).
543 Stat. 883 (1925)
(now 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1947)).
Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 5 185(a)
6Labor Management
(1952). The L.M.R.A. applies only to industries affecting interstate commerce. The United
States Arbitration Act, 61 Stat. 669, 9 U.S.C.A. S 1 (1947), provides a guiding
analogy in suits under section 301. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113
F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953); see Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 25 F.2d 133
(2d Cir. 1957). But see Local 149, American Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. General Elec.
Co., 250 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957). However, the Arbitration Act does not control the

Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. §5 141-97 (1947). General Elec. Co. v.
Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957). Moreover, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-15 (1932), does not conflict with section 301.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957).
' Supra note 6.
'Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The court stated
that the federal judiciary should develop a body of substantive law on collective bargaining agreements in which federal interpretation of federal law was to govern. 353 U.S.
at 457. In developing this body of law the courts are to draw on provisions and policies
of the L.M.R.A. and general legal principles. See 353 U.S. at 456-57.
' Ibid.
"OA. L. Kornman Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 264 F.2d 733 (6th Cir.
1959) (vacation pay); Textile Workers Union v. Cone Mills Corp. 268 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.
1959) (unemployment benefits).
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an arbitrator's award authorized by the contract now may be
specifically enforced by the union in a federal court."
Arbitration clauses do not necessarily include all disputes which
may arise between the parties, i.e., some differences may be subject to grievance procedure but not to arbitration." The court is
to decide whether a dispute is arbitrable under the contract," unless the contract leaves the question to the arbitrator."' In ordinary
commercial contracts the arbitrator's power to interpret the contract is not held to be power to award damages," but arbitrators in
labor cases have long assumed that they had the implied power to
make awards," either of money damages" or of other suitable
relief." State courts do not always share the labor arbitrators' views
on the question.' 9 Labor contracts in which "all disputes" between
the parties are to be arbitrated have been held to confer upon the
arbitrator the power to make a money award even though that
power is not specifically granted." On the basis of the statement in
Lincoln Mills that the arbitration clause was the quid pro quo for
the no-strike clause," one court has held that a contract containing both clauses is enforceable by damages awarded by an arbitrator even though no specific power to award damages is given the
arbitrator by the contract."
The court in the principal case reasoned that the parties should
not be forced to arbitrate upon that which they had not expressly
agreed to arbitrate, and hence the arbitrator had no implied power
1 A. L. Kornman Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, supra note 10.
'Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957).
"International Union, UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536, 539
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957); Local 149, American Fed'n of Technical
Eng'rs v. General Elec. Co., 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957).
14 International Union, UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., supra note 13. However, the question of whether the contract leaves the determination of arbitrability to
the arbitrator is for the courts to decide. Employees Labor Ass'n v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 172 F. Supp. 210 (D. Kans. 1959).
"Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
"6Phillips Chem. Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 721 (1951)
(overtime); United States Rubber
Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 839 (1949)
(same); International Harvester Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 894
(1947) (piece rates).
" Ibid.
"Celanese Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 168 (1954) (overtime; awarded equivalent work at
same pay).
"'See Guidry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 320 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other
grounds, -Tex.-,
327 S.W.2d 406 (1959); Lone Star Cotton Mills v. Thomas,
227 S.W.2d 300, 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). But see Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Local
405, UAW, 140 Conn. 32, 97 A.2d 898 (1953); Samuel Adler, Inc. v. Local 584, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 282 App. Div. 142, 122 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1953).
"0Local 130, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Mississippi Valley Elec. Co., 175 F.
Supp. 312 (E.D. La. 1959).
" Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
2"Local 130, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Mississippi Valley Elec. Co., 175 F.
Supp. 312 (E.D. La. 1959).
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to award a remedy of damages. 3 Since Lincoln Mills authorized the
development of federal substantive law under section 301 to be
drawn from appropriate sources, the court in the principal case
looked to a 1929 commercial dispute 4 and two state labor cases"
to support this principle and declined to follow a sizable body of
decisions by experienced labor arbitrators. " It is generally conceded
that commercial decisions lack sufficient similarity to labor problems
to be valid as precedent in labor cases.2 This dissimilarity is based on
the theory that commercial contracts usually cover a single transaction between parties relatively independent of each other while
labor contracts concern the prospective government of an entire
industrial operation and a large number of mutually dependent
parties."8 Historically, arbitrators have tended to take this difference
into account more often than have courts, possibly due to greater
familiarity with the nature of the differences.2" However, the reasoning in the principal case that the contract was not to have
internal sanctions gains some support from the union's retention
of the right to strike, but this reasoning deprives the contract of
sanctions which contribute to industrial peace.2" A similar case
has distinguished the principal case on the ground that the arbitrator must have power to enforce the agreement by appropriate
sanctions since the union had agreed not to strike."' The other basis
for the decision is more questionable. The court's fear of forcing the
company to alter its policy of no-work-no-pay seems to allow
company policy to override the purposes of the collective bargaining agreement, especially if the policy were established by unilateral
decision. If, however, the policy had attained the status of a past
practice impliedly merged into the contract by long usage and
acceptance, the court may have treated the matter as a case in
which one party was challenging that to which it had impliedly
agreed by its conduct.
The strict construction applied by the court ignores a fun23

268 F.2d 447, 455.

24

Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
2Guidry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 320 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App.)
rev'd on other
grounds, -Tex.-,
327 S.W.2d 406 (1959); Lone Star Cotton Mills v. Thomas,
227 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
28 See cases supra note 16.
27 Cox, Reflections on Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1489 (1959). But
it is not implied that all commercial contracts relate to situations sufficiently similar that
the interpretation of one will necessarily aid the interpretation of another.
28 Id. at 1490-91.
28 Cox, supra note 27, at 1487-89.
"°See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
"*Local 130, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Mississippi Valley Elec. Co., 175 F. Supp.
312 (E.D. La. 1959).
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damental purpose of arbitration, i.e., to resolve ambiguities in the
collective bargaining agreement. In view of the prevailing practice
of arbitrators to give appropriate relief (although not always
damages) for breach of labor contracts, the presumption should
be that the parties intended the arbitrator to have power to give
relief unless the power is expressly denied. The court's approach
would discourage good faith compliance with the contract since
the party who believed a contractual provision might be strictly
construed in its favor would be tempted to pursue its own ends until
a court decided the question. The resulting absence of prompt
sanctions may well lead to a severe narrowing of the scope of labor
arbitration unless union negotiators successfully insist upon express
provisions granting arbitrators broad remedial powers. Since much
of the reasoning of the court could as well be applied to grievances
arising from discharge without cause, unauthorized work by supervisors, disregard of seniority in promotion, or contracting out of
work in violation of an agreement, the burden of enforcing a great
deal of the modern collective bargaining contract may come to
rest upon the courts or upon economic pressure by the parties. This
result would seem to conflict with the policy of the Lincoln Mills
case, viz., that industrial peace can be more effectively achieved
through enforcement of arbitration contracts. The fact that this
policy is thwarted by a narrow construction of the contract rather
than by a narrow construction of the statute does not change the
result.
Elwood B. Hain, Jr.

Oil and Gas

-

Leases -

Implied Covenants

Plaintiff, lessor of thirty-one adjacent oil and gas leases covering
about 90,000 acres, sued Defendant, owner of the oil rights under
these leases, seeking to enforce the implied covenant or covenants
for adequate exploration and development insofar as oil is concerned. The oil and gas rights had been separated at least fifteen
years earlier and gas was subsequently fully developed, but no owner
of the oil rights had drilled prior to the institution of this suit. Two
of the one hundred fourteen wells drilled by the gas lessee had oil
"shows"; and Defendant had, over a period of two years after the
filing of this suit and three years after Plaintiff's first demand,
drilled eight wells, six of which produced in paying quantities and
seven of which were in a limited area. The trial court held for
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Plaintiff by ordering Defendant to commence drilling exploratory
wells under a yearly schedule established by the court, or surrender
certain amounts of acreage, or pay certain sums to the lessor in lieu
of drilling. Held, affirmed: Under certain facts, implied covenants to
explore, develop, and produce can be shown to have been breached
without requiring the lessor to show that drilling exploratory
wells will probably be profitable to the lessee. Sinclair Oil e Gas Co. v.
Masterson, 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959).
Recognizing that lessors enter into oil, gas, and mineral leases in
the expectation of production and royalty income, the courts early
found implied covenants in the lease contracts. Absent any express
drilling provisions,' it is well settled that a lessee has a duty to drill
diligently all necessary wells to secure oil and gas once either has
been discovered in paying quantities, for the mutual advantage of
both lessor and lessee.4 The hypothetical reasonably prudent operator
is the standard generally used to determine if a particular operator
of a particular lease is obligated to conduct further drilling.' This
standard requires that a lessee drill those wells which a prudent
operator would drill after the mythical operator has carefully
weighed all relevant factors,' e.g., nature of the property involved,
general conditions prevailing in the industry, and any other business
consideration that may relate to his decision." Courts have often
stated that a prudent operator acts with the interests of both the
lessor and himself in mind,' and that he is under no duty to operate
at a loss merely to benefit his lessor.' The majority of decisions place
the burden of proof on the lessor to establish that a prudent operator
should continue drilling, ' and this burden of proof includes a
showing that the lessee can probably expect a reasonable profit
'Gulf Prod. Co. v. Kishi, 129 Tex. 487, 492, 103 S.W.2d 965, 968 (1937).
'Kleppner v. Lemon, 176 Pa. 502, 35 Atl. 109 (1896).
1W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929).
4
Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 123 Tex. 229, 70 S.W.2d 576 (1934); Grubb v.
McAfee, 109 Tex. 527, 212 S.W. 464 (1919). Lessees are required to use all legitimate
means to have the maximum possible recovery of the minerals. Livingston Oil Corp. v.
Waggoner, 273 S.W. 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) error ref.
'Brown, The Implied Covenant For Additional Development, 13 Sw. L.J. 149,

155 (1959).
'Hays v. Bowser, 110 W. Va. 323, 158 S.E. 169 (1931).
'Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc. Co., 140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905); See Walker, The
Nature of Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11 Texas L. Rev.
399, 422-26 (1933).
'Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases § 75 (1st ed. 1926).
"Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Haggard, 152 Okla. 35, 3 P.2d 675 (1931); Texas Pac.
Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928); Hall v. South Penn
Oil Co., 71 W. Va. 82, 76 S.E. 124 (1912).
" Brown, supra note 5, at 174.
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after the required costs of drilling and production have been met.1
Some courts, however, have held that implied drilling covenants
were shown to be breached without the lessor showing that the
lessee can reasonably expect profit from further drilling." These
decisions usually have extreme factual situations, e.g., an unreasonable time has lapsed since the lessee last drilled," existing wells are
yielding very little production,14 the lessee has manifested an intent
to do no further drilling," a large tract is being held by production
from a small area,11 or there appears to be a prospect of production
although the amount thereof is not shown." It is said that such
facts indicate that the lessee is holding the lease for speculative
purposes onlys without due consideration of the interests of the
lessor,'" thus evidencing a prima facia case of breach although the
lessor has not shown that the lessee may reasonably expect profit
from further drilling."0 This theory in turn requires the lessee to
justify his inactivity by showing there can be no reasonable expectation of profit from additional drilling.1 ' However, if the delay
has been unconscionable, it has been held that even a showing of
no reasonable expectation of profit by the lessee will not aid him, and
conditional cancellation of the undeveloped portions of the lease
has been granted on the theory that it is inequitable for the lessee
to prevent the lessor from obtaining additional wells through some
other operator." Removing the burden of proof as to the probability
of profit from the lessor in these instances has caused some authorities to contend that a separate implied covenant of exploration
exists apart from that of development. It appears that this proposed
"1 Fort Worth Nat'l Bank v. McLean, 245 S.W.2d 309

(Tex. Civ. App. 1951)

error

ref. n.r.e.; Summers, Oil and Gas § 414 (perm. ed. 1959).
"Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934).
"Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943).
"4Colpitt v. Tull, 204 Okla. 289, 228 P.2d 1000 (1950); McKenna v. Nichlos, 193
Okla. 526, 145 P.2d 957 (1944). Oklahoma appears to be the leading state in granting
lessors relief without requiring them to prove a reasonable expectation of profit from
future drilling.
" Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Wilson, 215 F.2d 317, 3 0. & G. Rep. 2065 (10th Cir.
1954); Nunley v. Shell Oil Co., -La.-, 76 So. 2d 111, 4 0. & G. Rep. 236 (1954).
"8Ezzell v. Oil Associates, 180 Ark. 802, 22 S.W.2d 1015 (1930). Partial cancellation
was granted where two wells (one being a dry hole) were drilled on a 1,170 acre lease
over a period of eight years.
" Standard Oil Co. v. Giller, 183 Ark. 776, 38 S.W.2d 766 (1931).
's Brown, supra note 5, at 160.
"9Merrill, 4th Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Inst. 205, 216 (1958).
"°Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943).
"1Ibid.
Springs Home v. Clemens, 276 P.2d 262 (1954); See Discussion Note, 6
"Sand
0. & G. Rep. 833, 834 (1956).
23See Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 Texas L. Rev. 553
(1956).
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covenant would not allow the lessee to exercise the same caution as
in developing operations since it is argued that prudent operators

often drill exploratory wells with no reasonable expectation of
profit.2" This proposition has been vigorously attacked, 5 and the
recent Texas Supreme Court decision of Clifton v. Koontz" expressly
rejects it.
The principal case is the first decision applying Texas law which
clearly grants a lessor relief for breach of implied drilling covenants without the lessor showing that profit can be reasonably expected from further drilling. This decision may also be construed
as acknowledging the existence of an implied exploration covenant
as distinguished from the implied covenant to develop27 because
the court refers to implied covenants of exploration and development throughout the opinion." Recognizing that the immense

tract

and the

lapse of time

are facts which

distinguish

the principal case from the Clifton case, yet the court appears to

misconstrue the Clifton decision with respect to the existence of an
exploration covenant. The Texas Supreme Court in the Clifton de-

cision declined to rule on whether a showing that profit can be
reasonably expected is necessary to prove a breach of the development covenant when production from a small area is holding vast
acreage under lease or where an unreasonable length of time has
elapsed since the last drilling. The supreme court then turned to
the question of whether an implied covenant to explore exists apart
from that of development and answered this question in the negative, stating that prior Texas cases treat "the covenant of development as covering all additional drilling requirements after production is once obtained on the lease," with the exception of offset
24

Id. at 557.

25 Brown, supra note 5; Brown, The Proposed New Covenant of Further Exploration:

Reply6 to Comment, 37 Texas L. Rev. 303 (1959).
" -Tex.-, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959), noted, 14 Sw. L.J. 283 (1960).
21Willingham v. Bryson, 294 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), noted, 11 Sw.
L.J. 380 (1957), is the only Texas decision granting relief to a lessor for breach of
an implied exploration covenant after production in paying quantities had been obtained.
The court stated that proof of a breach of the exploration covenant did not require a
showing that profit can reasonably be expected from further drilling, but the court also
found that the evidence supported a breach of the implied covenant to develop. This
holding as to the exploration covenant has been expressly overruled in Clifton v. Koontz,
supra note 26. It has been contended that Perkins v. Mitchell, 153 Tex. 368, 268 S.W.2d
907 (1954), granted relief to a lessor without requiring that he prove a probability of
profitable production from further drilling, Meyers, supra note 23, at 580, but issue
has been taken with this view of the case. Brown, The Law of Oil and Gas Leases
342 (1958).
2271 F.2d at 313, 320, 321, 323, 324.
29 -Tex.-,
325 S.W.2d at 696.
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wells to prevent drainage." This language indicates that exploratory
wells in Texas must be obtained by a lessor under the development
covenant complete with its prudent operator standard. The court in

the instant case, interpreting the Clifton decision as to the exploration covenant as being limited to its facts, declined to follow it,
and stated that the facts at hand were "within the ambit of Sauder
1 a landmark development case" involving exv. Mid-Continent,""
3
ploratory wells. The lessee in the principal case was currently
maintaining drilling operations and the lessee's officers in Sauder
stated they had no intention to drill in the near or remote future;"
otherwise, the facts of the two cases are similar in that an unreasonable time had elapsed since the last drilling. The clearly stated issue
of the Sauder case is a breach of the implied development covenant;'s
yet, the court in the principal case ruled that the lessee has not complied with implied covenants of exploration-development."
In answer to the question left open in the Clifton decision as to
whether probability of profit from further drilling must be shown
to indicate a breach of the development covenant when a large
tract is involved or an unreasonable time has elapsed since the last
drilling, the instant case may be construed as authority which does
not require such a showing by the lessor. This conclusion in regard
to the development covenant, although supported by the court's
acknowledgement of the Sauder case as precedent, may be questioned
because the prudent operator standard was not discussed and an
exploration covenant was frequently mentioned. Moreover, it appears that relief was granted the lessor, not because of a breach of
the development covenant nor an exploration covenant alone, but
rather for a breach of both covenants. Although the result reached
appears correct under the facts, it is questionable whether this case
can be reconciled with the statements of law set forth in the Clifton
decision. The Texas Supreme Court there struck down the proposed
exploration covenant and did not limit its ruling to the facts. The
Clifton decision settles the issue of the existence, or rather non-exist30 Ibid.
8s271 F.2d at 321.
3 Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934).
03Brown, The Proposed New Covenant of Further Exploration: Reply to Comment,
37 Texas L. Rev. 303, 319 (1959).
" Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272, 280 (1934). This fact,
not present in the principal case, has been submitted as being the turning point of the
Sauder case because such an attitude did not comply with the prudent operator standard
by definition, viz., one who acts with regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee.
Brown, supra note 33, at 319.
33292 U.S. at 278.
'e2 7 1 F.2d at 321.
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ence of the proposed exploration covenant in Texas; yet, the principal decision tends to confuse by implying that an exploration covenant may exist in certain factual situations. This decision, although
not binding on Texas courts, carries certain weight as being a federal
court's interpretation of Texas law under the Clifton case. As to the
future, it has been argued that courts should search for substance
rather than form in implied covenant litigation, viz., pay more
attention to doing justice to the parties rather than attempting to
establish general rules which fail in a particular application."
Charles R. Johnson

Procedure- Discovery-List Of Witnesses
Obtained After Cause of Action Arises
Plaintiff was injured while a passenger on Defendant transit company's bus. After the accident the bus driver passed out cards to his
passengers in order to secure the names of those who might be
potential witnesses. This list of voluntarily submitted names was
then given to Defendant's trial attorney, Ladon, the relator in this
action. Plaintiff filed a "motion for discovery" under Texas Rule
1671 in an attempt to inspect and copy this list of witnesses. Upon
hearing the motion, the trial judge ordered Ladon to surrender this
list to Plaintiff. Ladon refused, and was held in contempt Held:
Relator released: Rule 167, relating to discovery and production of
documents, does not require an attorney to surrender a list of
witnesses obtained subsequent to an accident. Ex parte Ladon, -Tex.
-, 325 S.W.2d 121 (1959).
Under the common-law system of adversary proceedings, one
side could be in possession of material facts which, if undisclosed,
would result in an unfair trial or injustice to the parties.' Because
of this contentious theory, some device was necessary to permit one
" Merrill, supra note 19, at 243.
'Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann. rule 167 (1957).
' Appeal in Texas before a final judgment may be taken only in three situations,
namely, orders granting or refusing temporary injunctions, appointing receivers, and
determining pleas of privilege. Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641 (1933);
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 2008, 2250, 4662 (1958). Thus, the cumbersome procedure of contempt due to a refusal to comply with the discovery order is used to test
the validity of the order because a direct appeal from an interlocutory order is not permitted unless the order falls within one of the three named exceptions. A change allowing
a fourth exception to the rule in the case of a discovery order would seem more in
keeping with the theory of the new rules.
'Freedman, Discovery as an Instrument of Justice, 22 Temp. L.Q. 174 (1949).
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side of a lawsuit to obtain information which lay beyond its reach,
but which was necessary to the preparation of its case. 4 The device
employed has been a motion for discovery, which is a court order
requiring any party to the suit to produce relevant information
for the uninformed party's use.' Thus, the purpose of discovery has
been to provide effective machinery for ascertaining relevant facts
and to expedite a determination of each controversy on its merits,'
although an often utilized purpose is to obtain evidence for use at
the trial rather than information to aid in its preparation.7 Discovery, along with depositions,' physical examinations,' and pretrial procedure," are the customary examples of "rational means"
to discover facts before the trial." Accordingly, discovery affords
opportunity for settlement in lieu of litigation, or, if settlement
fails, makes the subsequent verdict in the cause to be one of fact
and not one of confusion or surprise." However, two conditions
have been uniformly imposed upon the right of discovery. First,
the matters into which inquiry is made must be relevant to the
controversy in question; and, secondly, the subject matter of the
inquiry must not be privileged." Federal courts have shortened
trials immeasurably and made for speedier and more fairly disclosed settlements through their discovery rule, 4 as have the nine
states which have enacted similar procedures." However, discovery
has been criticized as a principle which places a premium on laziness
and penalizes diligence, " e.g., the testimony of an expert witness
is obtainable by discovery;"' or as a force which reduces an adversary
43 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice

836 (1950).
5Dawson, Old Rights of Discovery in Modern Federal Court Practice, 24 Il1. L. Rev.
666 (1930).
6Mackerer v. New York Cent. Ry., 1 F.R.D. 408 (E.D. N.Y. 1940); Holtzoff, Twelve
Months Under the New Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 A.B.A.J. 45 (1940).
'Alexander, A Bill of Discovery, 2 Texas L. Rev. 483, 485 (1924). In 1957 the
supreme court created rule 186a which specifically authorizes depositions for the sole
purpose of discovery as well as for use as evidence.
'Rules 186-215a, Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann. (1957); Masterson, Adversary Depositions and Admissions Under Texas Practice, 10 Sw. L.J. 107 (1956).
'Since the repeal under pressure in 1941 of rule 168, which authorized trial courts
to order physical examinations where the physical condition was in controversy, Texas
courts have had no power to order the physical examination of a party without his consent.
Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Overstreet, 262 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref.
1°Rules 166-75, Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann. (1957).
11 Krook v. Blomberg, 95 N.H. 170, 59 A.2d 482 (1948).
121 Belli, Modern Trials 89 (1954).
a Freedman, supra note 3, at 175.
14Fed. R. Civ. P. 34; Belli, op. cit. supra note 12, at xxxv.
"5See Notes, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 673 (1955).
'6McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. N.Y.), aff'd, 113 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 (1940).
" Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948).
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proceeding to the status of an administrative hearing."8 Accordingly,
courts have imposed certain protective measures upon discovery
to prevent possible abuse. 1 "Fishing expeditions" are not allowed"0
unless the court is satisfied that there is reasonable certainty that
relevant information will be obtained. 1 Federal courts do not permit discovery in certain types of admiralty suits, 22 nor to certain
office files. 2 The attorney-client privilege likewise guards against
possible abuse." However, the best guard against misuse is the federal
court-applied "work product of the lawyer" standard, 2' which keeps
counsel from prying into his opponent's brief case.
The Texas discovery rule 21 provides that, upon showing of good
cause by any party, the court may order production for inspection
of documents, papers, books, or other tangible objects which are
not privileged and which are material to any action pending in the
court. However, the rule contains a proviso which prohibits discovery of written communications passing "between agents or
representatives or the employees of either party to the suit, or communications between any party and his ...employees, where made
subsequent to the occurence ...upon which the suit is based, and
made in connection with the prosecution, investigation or defense
of such claim ... . Moreover, an amendment to the rules in 1957
brought Texas in line with a 1948 amendment to the federal rules,
further restricting rule 167 by denying discovery where it would
result in undue annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, and expense to the one against whom it is directed. 2' Under this rule
"good cause" is determined by an exercise of trial court discretion,2'
and abuse of discretion in either granting" or denying" a motion
for discovery is difficult to establish on appeal.
In reaching the result in the instant case the court relied
"' Hawkins, Attorney-Client Privilege, 14 Texas B.J. 217 (1951).
20Vargos v. Clark, 8 F.R.D. 635 (D. D.C. 1949).
20 Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 Mich.
L. Rev. 205, 219 (1942).
22 Freedman, supra note 3, at 175.
22 Shelton v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 801

(S.D. N.Y. 1939); The Dalzellace, 10

F. Supp.
434 (S.D. N.Y. 1934).
23
In Re Hyde, 149 Ohio 407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (1948).
24Hawkins, supra note 18, at 245.
25 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
26Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann. rule 167 (1957).
27 This proviso, which is not found in federal rule 34, was drafted by the Rules
Committee and is found only in Texas.
28 Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann. rule 186b (1957).
2 Robb v. Gilmore, 302 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.
"Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W.2d 389 (1950).
"1See, Geo. S. May Co. v. Stephens Lumber Co., 301 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App.
1957).
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heavily upon a Rules Committee interpretation of rule 167 in a
hypothetical situation virtually identical to the instant case." This
interpretation of the discovery proviso would also seemingly prohibit the use of either a deposition or subpoena duces tecum to
secure a list of witnesses since the exact proviso in rule 167 exists
in these two procedures restricting their use.' Accordingly, it may
be questioned whether a party may ever obtain a list of witnesses
in his opponent's possession." Under federal rule 34, absent the
proviso but applying the "work product of the lawyer" protective
standard," the discovery of a list of witnesses as in the instant case
would not have been prevented.'" There is no legitimate reason
involving justice which would place a list of witnesses in the hands
of one party and out of the reach of the other." Under the Texas
proviso there remain further unanswered questions, e.g., as to the
proper interpretation of the words "subsequent" and "investigation." 8 If Plaintiff in the instant case had died after the list was
made, would the decision in the principal case extend to deny discovery? Since an action for wrongful death does not accrue until
the instant of death,'" it may be argued that the list would be obtainable.
The structure of the Texas proviso has resulted in a decision
that is not in conformity with the purpose of discovery, and which
may result in serious injustice where the list of witnesses is the only
means available to secure persons to substantiate a cause of action.
A more practical rule should give broader discretion to the trial
judge, and yet prevent prying into the opposing party's brief case.
The federal "work product" rule has provided adequate protection
without this burdensome proviso. A legislative change would place
Texas discovery procedure more in accord with the combined
"'Civil Procedure, 9 Texas B.J. 319

(1946).

3 Some, however, believe this may still be possible since rule 186a is broader in some

aspects than rule 167. Thode, Some Reflections on the 1957 Amendments to the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure Pertaining to Witnesses at Trial, Depositions, and Discovery, 37
Texas L. Rev. 33, 38-40 (1957); Notes, 38 Texas L. Rev. 642, 644 (1960).
4 The only possible rule which would allow discovery of a list of witnesses seems
to be the general Bill of Discovery, rule 737. However, this use of rule 737 has never
been tested in a court action. Since it is a separate lawsuit, appeal would be immediate
after ruling, thus eliminating the clumsy "contempt" procedure. See supra, note 2.
"See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
6
" Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lauritzen, 182 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1950); Wilson v.
David, 21 F.R.D. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1957); Viront v. Wheeling & L.E. Ry., 10 F.R.D. 45
(N.D. Ohio 1950); see also Reynolds v. Boston & Maine Transp. Co., 98 N.H. 251, 98 A.
157 (1953).
'eThode, supra note 33, at 40.
"Cf. Notes, 35 Texas L. Rev. 598, 600 (1957); Thode, supra note 33, at 39.
9
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5526(7) (1958); Hunnington v. Walker's Austex
Chili Co., 285 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref.
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principles of speed and justice which form the very basis of the
discovery rule. Perhaps the supreme court will continue the reform
begun in 195740 by substituting the "work product" rule for the
present proviso of rule 167.
Henry Nuss, III

Taxation-Life Insurance-Proceeds From
Policies, Owned By Corporation
The president-shareholder of a closely-held corporation secured
an insurance policy on his own life, naming the corporation
beneficiary and reserving to it the right to change the beneficiaries.
Pursuant to a predetermined plan, the corporation became the
owner of the policy, paid all premiums, and named Plaintiff and
other shareholders as beneficiaries. On the death of the officer the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue concluded that the proceeds
received by Plaintiff were taxable as a dividend. The Tax Court
sustained the Commissioner against Plaintiff, who did not report
the proceeds received from the insurance company as income. Held:
When a president of a closely-held corporation obtains a life insurance policy on himself, naming the corporation beneficiary and
reserving to it the right to change the beneficiaries, and subsequently the corporation becomes the owner of the policy, pays all
premiums, and names certain of its shareholders as beneficiaries,
the insurance proceeds received by the shareholder by reason of
the death of the insured are not taxable as a corporate dividend.
Ducros v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1959).
Life insurance policies on a corporate officer can be assigned to
the corporation' as long as it is not a cover for a "wager policy."'
Section 22 (b) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, now
Section 101 (a) (1) of the 1954 Code, exempts from taxation
amounts received under a life insurance policy paid by reason of
the death of the insured. Hence, a corporation, having an insurable
interest in the life of its officers,' is not taxed on the proceeds it
to rule 186b; 20 Texas B.J. 187 (1957).
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1933).

40 E.g., the amendment

'Lincoln

'Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1877).
a It is generally against public policy for one who has no insurable interest to be the
owner of a policy on the life of another person. Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. Whiteside, 94
F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1938). A person has an insurable interest in his own life and may
legally name whomever he pleases as beneficiary under a policy on his life. Lawrence v.
Traveler's Ins. Co., 6 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1934). For a basic definition and discussion
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receives upon the death of an insured officer.' However, if those
proceeds are subsequently distributed to the shareholders of the
corporation, they are taxed to the shareholders as a dividend to
the extent the corporation has earnings and profits.'
Business purchase agreements, which commonly utilize the insurance fund as the source of the purchase price for the interest

of a deceased owner, are usually employed in partnerships and
closely-held corporations.' Difficult tax problems concerning corporations have arisen as a result of the payment of insurance
premiums and the handling of proceeds. Outstanding among the
arguments of the Commissioner in these cases is the theory of constructive dividends." In Casale v. Commissioner,' which involved
a deferred compensation agreement between the corporation and
its president, with the corporation being both the owner and
beneficiary of the policy of insurance, the court held that the policy
was a corporate asset. Hence, the payment of the premiums by the
corporation did not constitute a dividend to the president-shareholder of the corporation! Prunier v. Commissioner" represents a
like holding with reference to a stock retirement plan in a closelyheld corporation. The constructive dividend theory was again re1
jected in Sanders v. Fox"
which dealt with a stock redemption agreement between the shareholders of a closely-held corporation. In that
case the taxpayer designated the beneficiaries, but the proceeds were
made subject to the agreement of the corporation to retire the
stock of the deceased shareholder. The court held that the benefits of
the investment in the policy went to the corporation as owner of the
policy, with the taxable benefits received by the shareholder,
e.g., a guaranteed minimum price for his stock, being contingent
and incapable of determination until the stock was redeemed. Yet,
of "insurable interest," see Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881). For a discussion
of the insurable interest of a corporation in its shareholders and officers, see 2 Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice §§ 871-72 (1941, Supp. 1957). See also Harnett, Taxation
of Life Insurance 53-56 (1957).
"United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189 (1924).
'Cummings v. Commissioner, 73 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1934). See also Golden v.
Commissioner, 113 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1940).
6See Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 687 (1958).

7 See Note, 40 Va. L. Rev. 43 (1954).
"247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
'The court stated that the retirement agreement at most gave the taxpayer an unsecured claim under his contract which might even be subordinated to the claims of other
creditors in the event of insolvency of the corporation. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295 (1939).
10248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957). See Mannheimer & Friedman, Stock Retirement
Agreements, 28 Taxes 423, 425 (1950).
1253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958).
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it seems settled that if the taxpayer obtains a policy, naming himself
or his specific designees as beneficiaries, and the corporation pays
the premiums, those premiums will be taxable to the taxpayer since
the policy would then be his asset." The Commissioner has acquiesced
in the theories adopted in the Casale, Prunier, and Sanders cases."3
The constructive dividend theory has been argued by the Commissioner in many areas with varying degrees of success." The instant case represents an effort by the Commissioner to have the
theory, which has been relatively unsuccessful as to premium payments, adopted as to the proceeds of insurance policies. This question
was before the court in Doran v. Commissioner" where the proceeds were payable to trustees (officers of the corporation) as
beneficiaries and owners of the policies to be used by them to purchase the stock of any shareholder who died. The court held that the
proceeds were not dividends since the corporation was neither owner
nor beneficiary of the policies, even though it did have the right to
change the beneficiaries. However, the corporation in the instant
case was the owner of the policy in addition to having the power
to change the beneficiaries. The avoidance of a second tax may have
been the policy reason for the decision in the Doran case, but this is
hardly a sound explanation for the decision in the instant case since
the payment of premiums by the corporation in the instant case
would not be taxable dividends under the accepted rule. Further,
"Paramount-Richards

Theatres v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946). See

also Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933); Yuengling v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 971
(3d Cir. 1934).
saRev. Rul. 59-184, 1959-1 Cum. Bul. 65 (1959).
"The following are among the most frequently occurring transactions that may give
rise to the receipt of constructive dividends by the shareholder: See Brafford, The Constructive Receipt of Dividends by Stockholders of a Closely-Held Corporation, published
in three parts; Part I, 46 Ky. L.J. 515 (1958); Part II, 47 Ky. L.J. 17 (1958); Part III,
47 Ky. L.J. 378 (1959):
(1) stockholder advances and loans to the corporation, 46 Ky. L.J. 520-31
(1958) (Part I);
(2) advances and loans by the corporation to some or all of the stockholders,
46 Ky. L.J. 531-42 (1958)
(Part I);
(3) compensation paid to stockholder-officers of the corporation, 47 Ky. L.J.
17-30 (1958)
(Part II);
(4) rentals and royalties paid to stockholders, 47 Ky. L.J. 30-37 (1958)
(Part II) ;
(5) distributions of property and bargain sales and purchases, 47 Ky. L.J.
37-46 (1958)
(Part II);
(6) bargain use of corporate property, 47 Ky. L.J. 378-81 (1959) (Part I1);
(7) payments on behalf of the stockholder by the corporation, 47 Ky. L.J.
381-86 (1959) (Part III); and
(8) purchase of insurance by the corporation upon the lives of the stockholders,
47 Ky. L.J. 386-95 (1959) (Part III).
15246 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1957).
16 See note 13 supra. There was no holding as to the taxation of the premium payments
as dividends in the Doran case, but it is evident that they would be considered dividends
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the court in the Doran case implied that if the corporation had been
named beneficiary and had used the proceeds to buy the stock for
the remaining shareholders, the surviving shareholders would have
realized a dividend from the corporation for the full amount of the
proceeds. This result was also implied in the Sanders case.
The courts have repeatedly affirmed the rule that in tax cases
the form of the transaction will not control where the transaction
is one which does not vary in substance the control or change the
flow of economic benefits." The fundamental inquiry is whether
the taxpayer has really received income." It seems evident that
the courts in the Casale, Prunier, and Sanders cases have failed to
adhere to this rule. The reasoning as to proceeds in the Doran case
seems to be correct, but the court in the instant case seems to ignore
the substance of the transaction when it holds that the proceeds
were not dividends to the shareholders since the corporation had
no control over the proceeds,"' for when the right to change the
beneficiary is retained, the named beneficiary has only an expectancy"0 and not a vested interest."' Thus, the naming of Plaintiff
as beneficiary by the owner-corporation amounted to nothing
more than a revocable assignment of the corporation's right to
receive those proceeds. This situation is analogous to that
in Harrisonv. Schaffner," where the court held that an assignment
of trust income by a beneficiary for a term was, in point of substance, a method of tax avoidance that would not prevent the income from being taxed to the beneficiary. That court distinguished
Blair v. Commissioner," where the income was assigned for life with
no retention of control by the assignor. This line of cases seems
analogous to the instant case since here the corporation, under the
guise of insurance formality, is using its ownership of the policy
and control of the proceeds to effectuate a dividend distribution
in substance. Although the corporation did not have control over
the time at which the proceeds would vest, the control it had
since the corporation was neither owner nor beneficiary of the policy but paid the
premiums with a charge to surplus.
"'Higgins v. Smtih, 308 U.S. 473 (1940). See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,
324 U.S. 331 (1945); Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924). See also 3 P-H Fed.
Taxees 55 21,210; 21,212; 21,213; 21,221; 21,222 (1960).
"SLewis v. O'Malley, 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944).
'" 272 F.2d at 51 (1959).
"Doering
v. Buechler, 146 F.2d 784 (8th Cir. 1945). This is true even though the
beneficiary pays the premiums. Minning v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 88 Ohio App.
339, 95 N.E.2d 269 (1950).
"1State Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 126 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1942); Oetting v. Sparks,
109 Ohio St. 94, 143 N.E. 184 (1923).
"2312 U.S. 579 (1941).
3 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
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through the ownership of the policy and the right to change the
beneficiaries at will seems to be almost complete control in reality.
It may also be argued with some force that when such control is
held by a closely-held corporation it is of little significance in
economic reality whether the corporation or the shareholders
exercise the control, since the control of management by the shareholders will avoid the possibility that there will be a change of beneficiaries adverse to their interests in the policy; whereas the shareholders-beneficiaries may be more or less at the mercy of management in the publicly-held corporation. However, looking at the control which the corporation has retained over the policy, the fact that
the corporate assets (the insurance proceeds) are payable to the
shareholders directly by the insurance company does not seem to
"vary the control or change the flow of economic benefits" from
the corporation to the shareholders.
Although the instant case, in rejecting the constructive dividend
theory as to the payment of proceeds, is in harmony with the
Casale, Prunier, and Sanders cases which reject the theory as to
the payment of premiums, the policy outlined in all these decisions
seems to be in conflict with the established rule that substance will
control over the form of the transaction. Such conflicts between
legal form and economic reality must be resolved with the realization that taxation is a practical field of law in which the niceties
of legal form have often been considered relatively unimportant,
especially when used as a cover for a plan of tax avoidance. If
there is no consistency with which the courts can apply such a
doctrine, the better solution may be in specific legislation, at least
with reference to tax consequences of business purchase agreements funded by insurance.
George Howard Nelson

Taxation-Oil And Gas DepletionEconomic Interest
The taxpayer entered into a series of "legal relationships" with
leasehold owners of undeveloped oil and gas leases in the La Gloria
Field area. In exchange for 50% of the heavier hydrocarbons "contained in all gas to be produced from said leases" the taxpayer
agreed to unitize the area (3 units), construct a cycling plant, drill
sufficient gas wells to produce a predetermined amount of gas per
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day, and process gas from the field. The leasehold owners were to
own the wells, casing equipment, and top well connections and
were to have full and complete control of the operation of the
wells. The taxpayer obtained a special order from the Railroad
Commission of Texas which permitted the cycling of gas, i.e.,
separation of heavier hydrocarbons from the gas and injection of
the residue gas into the reservoir under pressure. Pursuant to these
agreements, the taxpayer expended approximately $5,452,000, which
it contended was a capital investment in the minerals in place
entitling it to a deduction from gross income for depletion of its
50 % interest in the heavier hydrocarbons. However, the taxpayer did
not contend that its depletable income encompassed the proceeds
from the sale of gas extracted from units outside the 3 units in the
La Gloria Field area which constituted 20% of its gross income.
The district court upheld the taxpayer's contention and the Government appealed. Held: Where a taxpayer does not acquire by investment any interest in minerals in place, it has no economic interest
in minerals which will entitle it to a deduction for depletion.
Scofield v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 268 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 933 (1960).
Section 611 of the Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction
from gross income for the depletion of mineral deposits.' This deduction provides for a return of the taxpayer's investment as the
mineral deposits are exhausted by production.2 In the early cases
the taxpayer's right to the depletion deduction was based upon the
legal formalism of his interest in the property, e.g., fee ownership.'
However, in 1933 the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Bender" enunciated the concept of the "economic interest in minerals" in order to
afford uniform treatment for depletion deduction purposes to the
various interests in oil and gas property.' In that case the Court did
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 611.

2 United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 302

(1927); Breeding & Burton, Taxation of

Oil and Gas Income 161-65 (1954); Fiske, Federal Taxation of Oil and Gas Transactions
S 7.01 (1959); Miller, Oil and Gas Federal Income Taxation 9 (3d ed. 1957); Comment,
3 So. Tex. L.J. 344 (1958).
'Weiss v. Mohawk Mining Co., 264 Fed. 502 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 637
(1920); I.T. 1920 111-1 Cum. Bull. 188, 190 (1924); 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation
§ 24.20 (1954); Sneed, The Economic Interest-An Expanding Concept, 35 Texas L. Rev.
307, 309-18 (1957). See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, (1932); Aikman, Economic
Interests of Purchasers and Processors of Natural Gas, N.Y.U. 17th Annual Inst. on
Fed. Tax. 473 (1959).
4287 U.S. 551 (1933).
5Id. at 555; Hogan v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
710 (1944); Paulston, Tax Consequences of "Net Profits Interests" in Oil and Gas
Transactions, P-H Oil and Gas Taxes 5 1009 (1958); Comment, 24 Tul. L. Rev. 112
(1949).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

not consider a fee owner as the only possessor of an economic
interest. Rather, the Court stated that a taxpayer would be entitled
to the depletion deduction whenever he acquired by investment any
interest in minerals in place, and secured, by any form of legal
relationship, income from the extraction of minerals.' In later decisions the Court narrowly construed the language of Palmer v. Bender"
by interpreting the requisite of an interest by investment in the
minerals in place as "ownership,"' e.g., a processor must have control
over production to have an economic interest! In 1940 the Court
further qualified the concept by requiring that a holder of an
economic interest look solely to the extraction of minerals for a
return of his capital."0 From these decisions it appeared that a
"net profits" interest was not sufficient to constitute an economic
interest in minerals. However, in two later "net profits" cases the
Court held that a lessor, lessee, or transferee had an economic interest if he had a "possibility of profit" dependent solely upon the
extraction of minerals by the use of his rights to control certain
aspects of production." Moreover, in a recent case the Court held
that an upland owner, whose property was indispensable to the
extraction of adjacent offshore oil deposits, was entitled to the
deduction for depletion."'
The first of two requirements for an economic interest is that
the taxpayer must acquire by investment an interest in the minerals
in place." To ascertain if a gas processor has an interest by investment in the minerals in place the courts have examined the precise
'Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933); Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b) (1960);
Fiske, supra note 2, at § 2.02.
Ibid.
'Sneed, Another Look at the Economic Interest Concept, Southwestern Legal Foundation 10th Annual Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 353, 359 (1959). See Helvering v. Elbe
Oil Land Dev. Co., 303 U.S. 372, 374-75 (1938)
(where taxpayer sold property for 1/3
of net profits from minerals, he divested himself of all interest in oil and gas in place);
Helvering v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 370 (1938) (where taxpayer sold stock in corporation
which owned the minerals for 1/3 of net profits from an oil and gas lease, this was
a personal covenant by vendee and did not give taxpayer an interest by investment in
minerals); Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938); Thomas v. Perkins,
301 U.S. 655 (1937) (holder of an oil payment had an economic interest).
Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., supra note 8, at 368.
"Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1940).
"Burton-Sutton
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25, 34-35 (1946)
(assignee of
contract to develop oil land was permitted a deduction from gross income for net profits
paid to the grantor of the assignor); Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S.
599, 604 (1946) (owner of land who leased it and retained a net profits interest had
an economic interest). Paulston, supra note 5, at
1009.4.
" Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956), noted, 10
Sw. L.J. 333 (1956).
aid. at 314; Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)
(1960).
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legal form or nature of the processing agreement."4 Accordingly, in
Signal Gasoline Corp. v. Commissioner" the court in reviewing a
casinghead gas contract concluded that although there was no
actual conveyance of minerals in place to the processor, its method
of operation, i.e., the use of gas lifts, rodless pumps, and compressors to extract the casinghead gas from its position in the earth,
constituted an interest by investment in the minerals in place.'"
However, in Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co.' the Supreme Court
determined that the gas processor was not entitled to the depletion
deduction since his agreement to purchase gas at the wellhead gave
him only an economic advantage and not an economic interest."
The Court reasoned that inasmuch as the processor was not conveyed
minerals in place and had no control over production, it had not
acquired by investment any interest in the minerals in place."'
Subsequently, the Tax Court in Edward J. Hudson" held that a
processor, who was assigned 507%of the heavier hydrocarbons in
place, possessed an interest by investment in the minerals in place."
The second requirement for an economic interest is that the taxpayer must look solely to income which is derived from the extraction of minerals for a return of his capital." Accordingly, where
the taxpayer could receive income from either the oil and gas produced or from the sale of the fee title to the land, he did not have
a depletable economic interest since the amount of his return was
not directly conditioned upon the contingencies of production."
Therefore, if capital is returnable from some source other than
"4Aikman, supra note 3; see Signal Gasoline Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 886,
888 (9th Cir. 1933).
" Id. at 886.
"Signal Gasoline Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 1933). However,
in Signal Gasoline Corp. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1935), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 657 (1936) the Court determined that the depletion deduction would be on
the value of the natural product, i.e., wet gas at the mouth of the well, rather than
from proceeds of the sale of gas; thus, the processor here could not obtain the deduction
for the depletion of his income. See Brea Cannon Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 67
(9th Cir.) cert. denied, 296 U.S. 604 (1935); Miller, Gas Processing Plant Depletion,
7 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 215, 220-25 (1958).
"303 U.S. 362 (1938).
"s Id. at 367-68. See McDowell, Depletable Interests: Economic Interests v. Economic
Advantage, N.Y.U. 18th Annual Inst. on Fed. Tax. 517 (1960).
" Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362, 368 (1938).
21 11 T.C. 1042 (1948),
aff'd, Hudson Eng'r Corp. v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 180
(5th Cir. 1950).
" Id. at 1049.
"Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 314 (1956); Anderson
v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. $51 (1933); Treas.
Reg. § 1.611-1(b) (1960).
as Anderson v. Helvering, supra note 22, at 412.
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production, the court will not attempt to allocate the depletion
allowance between the different sources. 4

In the principal case a majority of the court examined the processing agreement and concluded that the processor merely had purchased a share of the liquid product to be produced and was not
conveyed any present interest in the minerals in place." Moreover,
since the processor did not reserve any right to control the operation
of the wells, the majority reasoned that it did not acquire by investment any interest in the heavier hydrocarbons in place."6 Judge
Brown (dissenting) reasoned that not only was La Gloria actually
engaged in production, but also that La Gloria's processing activities

were indispensable to production; therefore, it had acquired by
investment an interest in the gas in place." However, the majority
pointed out that in the analogous Bankline" case the Supreme Court
had not considered "indispensability" to production as conferring
upon the processor an interest by investment in the minerals in

place.2" If La Gloria were engaged in production, as the majority

implies, ° then the Bankline"' case is distinguishable since Bankline
was only the recipient of gas under a contract." By way of dictum
the majority noted that the processor received 20% of its income
from units outside the La Gloria Field area; therefore, inasmuch as
it did not look to the extraction of minerals from any single producing property for recoupment of its large investment, it could
not have an economic interest.s" The majority reasoned that if the
processor made a substantial investment for the purpose of extracting minerals from several producing units, each having entirely unrelated reserves, then its fortunes would not rise and fall
in the same way as the lease owner's when new reservoirs were
24Bergen, Oil and Taxes-Some Problems and Proposals, 26 So. Cal. L. Rev. 396,
413 (1953).
25268 F.2d at 707; Branscomb, Recent Developments in Oil and Gas Taxation,

Southwestern Legal Foundation 1lth Annual Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 615 (1960);
Miller, Gas Processing Plant Depletion, 9 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 1, 4, 18 (1959). The
principal case was also discussed by Simon, La Gloria Decision Shifts Depletion But
Doesn't Say Where Manufacturing Begins, 11 J. Tax. 176 (1959).
21 Id. at 707.
2'268 F.2d at 713-16.
2" Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
2' 268 F.2d at 707.
30a d. at 708. This question of whether or not the processor was a producer was left
unanswered by the majority except for the statement made in footnote 4 at 708, that
if they had found an economic interest they would have determined that production
ended at the fractionator. See also Mountain Producers Corp. v. Commissioner, 303 U.S.
376 (1938) (oil refiner was regarded as a producer and thus had an economic interest);
G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 219; Miller, supra note 16, at 228-30.
" Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
32Id. at 367.
sa 268 F.2d at 708-09.
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discovered or when the present reservoirs ran dry." It is this
dictum which provides one of the singular features of the principal case. If this dictum is adopted, a gas processor may never
be able to acquire a sufficient economic interest for depletion purposes since few processors look to income from only one field to
recoup their investment."
It appears from the principal case that if a processor is to acquire
by investment an economic interest in the minerals he must (1)
be in the chain of title, i.e., possess a legal or equitable property
interest in the minerals lasting for the productive life of the property; or (2) have substantial control and beneficial enjoyment of
the income from the mineral deposit. Thus, this decision indicates a
retreat from the economic realities of a transaction and a return to
the formalism of the "ownership" doctrine. It is this writer's
opinion that the decision of the principal case is inconsistent with
5
Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co."
The processing arrangement in the principal case was as indispensable to the production of gas as was the use of the upland owner's adjacent property
in the Southwest Exploration37 case. The fact is that without La
Gloria's cycling plant the gas could not be produced without waste,
and this would violate Texas law.3" Unfortunately, the denial of
certiorari by the Supreme Court has postponed the solution of this
confusing situation. Therefore, until the situation is clarified, it is
recommended that if a processor wishes to obtain the depletion
deduction it should insist upon formal conveyances of a property
interest in the minerals in place, or it should require substantial
control over the production of the well. 9

David E. Varner

Torts -

Protection of Property -

Weather Modification

A group of cotton farmers employed Defendent, a weather modi-

fication company, to seed clouds above and in the vicinity of
Plaintiffs' lands in an attempt to prevent hail damage to the farmers'
Ibid.
a Branscomb, supra note 25, at 626-29.
3'350 U.S. 308 (1955).
37Ibid.
3
8Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6008 (1949).
z The effect of such a provision in the processing agreement may be nullified if the
dictum of the principal case, regarding the second requirement of an economic interest,
is accepted by the courts.
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crops. Plaintiffs sought an injunction claiming Defendant's activities
diminished and prevented precipitation in any form, and thus
damaged Plaintiffs' ranching operations. The trial court granted
pendente lite injunctions against all cloud seeding in that area, which
order was modified by the court of civil appeals by temporarily
enjoining Defendant from seeding only those clouds directly above
Plaintiffs' lands. Held: Cloud seeding immediately above a person's
land may be temporarily enjoined to preserve the status quo until
a trial on the merits can be held. Southwest Weather Research, Inc.
v. Jones, -Tex.-, 327 S.W.2d 417 (1959).
The courts early recognized that interferences with ownership of
real property consisted not only of physical entries upon the land
but also of entries above' and below' the surface. Frequently the
doctrine of cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos,
meaning that one's title to land extends upward to the heavens and
downward to the center of the earth, was applied to protect the
landowner from interferences above and below the surface of his
land.' However, with the advent of aviation this doctrine became
subject to certain exceptions, 4 and recently the United States Supreme
Court declared it obsolete.' In addition to the ad coelum doctrine,
the landowner was said to have certain "natural rights" incidental
to his ownership,' i.e., the right to enjoy the land in its natural condition. Specifically, these include the right to riparian waters,' support of land,' drainage,' atmospheric conditions," and underground
'Puroto

v. Chieppa, 78 Conn. 401, 62 At. 664 (1905); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co.

v. Barnes, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1290, 101 S.W. 301 (1907).
'Harrington v. City of Port Huron, 86 Mich. 46, 48 N.W. 641 (1891); Chartiers
Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 Atl. 597 (1893).
'Prosser, Torts § 13, at 60 (2d ed. 1955).
"Restatement, Torts § 194 (1934). Flight over another's land is said to be privileged
if conducted:
(a) for travel or other legitimate purposes,
(b) in a reasonable manner,
(c) at a reasonable height so as not to interfere with the surface owner, and
(d) in conformance with relevant governmental regulations.
'United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946). Recognizing that Congress
has declared the air a public highway, 72 Stat. 798, 49 U.S.C.A. 5 1508 (1958), the Court
ruled that recognition of a private claim to airspace would clog these highways, seriously
interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer into private
ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.
'See 3 Tiffany, Real Property § 714 (3d ed. 1939). In Spann v. City of Dallas, 111
Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921), the court recognized that interferences with a person's
use and enjoyment of land are regarded as actionable, stating, "Property in a thing consists
not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment
and disposal." 111 Tex. at 355, 235 S.W. at 514.
"Mud Creek Irr. Co. v. Vivian, 74 Tex. 170, 11 S.W. 1078 (1889).
"Simon v. Nance, 100 S.W. 1038 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7589(a) (1925); Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 49
S.W.2d 404 (1932).
'oPitner v. Shugart Bros., 150 Ga. 340, 103 S.E. 791 (1920).
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waters.11 However, not all natural rights are absolute12 as some are
subject to reasonable interferences by others."3 Moreover, some rights
are said to be subject to the correlative rights of others' on the
theory that the exercise of one's rights should not unreasonably interfere with those same rights of others." The result is that equities are
often balanced to determine if an interference should be prohibited."
Few cases have been reported on weather modification. The first
decision on this point expressly recognized no property interest in
clouds above an owner's land.' Using the ad coelum theory to support a land owner's claimed interest in clouds has been rejected as
inappropriate in light of precedent which has all but extinguished
the doctrine," and also because application of the doctrine would
largely abolish weather modification." Legal writers, however, have
considered other doctrines as being analogous to the problem of
weather modification, viz., riparian rights," rights to percolating
waters," and doctrines relating to animals ferae naturae." The riparian and percolating waters theories are generally based on "reasonable
use,"" but this analogy collapses when applied to weather control
since clouds follow no well-defined route, nor is the amount of
moisture in a cloud readily measurable or continuously available, as
with riparian or underground waters.' Since clouds are objects of
a fugitive nature, apparently owned by no one, and because manipulation of the moisture therein appears to be a form of control or
possession, clouds may be analogous to animals ferae naturae."
Allowing free appropriation by anyone, however, has been criticized
as leaving the landowner in a helpless state." The only Texas decision
"3 Tiffany, Real Property §5 746-49 (3d ed. 1939).
"See Restatement, Torts, Scope and Introductory Note 55 822-40, at 224 (1939).
"City of Temple v. Mitchell, 180 S.W.2d 959 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
4Mud Creek Irr. Co. v. Vivian, 74 Tex. 170, 11 S.W. 1078 (1889).
"See Hildebrand, The Rights of Riparian Owners at Common Law in Texas, 6 Texas
L. Rev. 19 (1928).
"eHogue
v. City of Bowie, 209 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
7
1 Slutzky v. City of New York, 197 Misc. 730, 97 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1950). It appears
that the court's refusal to acknowledge a landowner's interest may be dictum as the case
seems to turn on the factor that the equities were heavily in favor of the landowner's
opponent.
"Comment, 34 Marq. L. Rev. 262, 265 (1951).
"ONote, 37 Texas L. Rev. 799, 802 (1959); Note, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 332, 334 (1951).
"' Ball, Shaping the Law of Weather Control, 58 Yale L.J. 213, 234 (1949).
"Comment,
37 Calif. L. Rev. 114, 117 (1949).
"Comment, I Stan. L. Rev. 43 (1949).
"' Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74, Pac. 766 (1903); see Hildebrand, supra note
15. The doctrines are often stated in the negative, i.e., a landowner has the right to use
such so long as his use does not unreasonably interfere with the use of others.
"4Ball, supra note 20, at 234.
"' Comment, supra note 21, at 119.
Note, 37 Texas L. Rev. 799, 802 (1959).
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considering weather modification is the court of civil appeals opinion
in the principal case, holding that a landowner has a "natural right"
to moisture in clouds directly above his land. 7
In affirming the civil appeals decision, the supreme court in the
instant case declined to define the rights of the parties in view of
the impending trial on the merits."8 The court merely ruled that
there had been no abuse of discretion under these facts in modifying and affirming the temporary injunction issued by the trial court."
The holding of the intermediate appellate court purported to preserve
the status quo by prohibiting cloud seeding directly above Plaintiffs'
land on the theory that Plaintiffs are entitled "to such precipitation
as Nature deigns to bestow."3 Following the theory that Defendant
had infringed Plaintiffs' natural rights incidental to his ownership
of the land, the court of civil appeals nevertheless found the trial
court's injunction "too broad" in restraining Defendant's activities
in the general area of Plaintiffs' lands. 1 Although it was stated that
Plaintiffs are entitled to such rainfall as "Nature in her caprice, may
provide,"3 the court of civil appeals did not insure Plaintiffs of this
result by enjoining weather modification directly over Plaintiffs'
lands, because Defendant may still engage in cloud seeding over immediately adjacent lands. Considering the nature and movement
of clouds, it appears that this limited relief is inconsistent with the
theory on which the decision is based. Bypassing considerations of
reasonableness of the interference, the supreme court in the principal
case, by affirming and thus seemingly approving of the civil appeals
decision, has established a rigid rule which fails to preserve the
status quo and is difficult to reconcile with the "natural rights"
theory. If the court intended to adopt the theory of the civil appeals
decision, it follows that the relief should have been more comprehensive.
Possibly, too little is known of the scientific aspects of weather
control at this time to formulate any fixed legal rule. The courts
will have a difficult time with weather litigation until science can
"
error
App.
2'
2

Southwest Weather Research v. Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958)
granted; Southwest Weather Research v. Rounsaville, 320 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ.
1958) error granted.
327 S.W. 2d 417, 420.
Id.at 421.
30Southwest Weather Research v. Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958)
error granted; Southwest Weather Research v. Rounsaville, 320 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958) error granted.
in Ibid.
as Southwest Weather Research v. Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958)
error granted; Southwest Weather Research v. Rounsaville, 320 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958) error granted.
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authoritatively predict the actual effects of weather modification.
Meterologists, however, have been reluctant to experiment in order
to gain this knowledge because of the legal implications involved."'
In view of the vast potentialities of weather control, the courts are
presently faced with the problem of equitable regulation, i.e., permitting the science to develop while prohibiting it from unreasonably
infringing on rights of innocent parties. If the test of an alleged
interference should be reasonableness, and it appears that it should,
then the location of the act of cloud seeding becomes immaterial.
Although the problem has no perfect analogy to an already existing
body of law, it appears that the doctrines of riparian ownership and
percolating waters, based on reasonable use in light of the rights of
others, are the most analogous and suitable at this time.
Charles R. Johnson

Wills- Probate- Partition By
Independent Executor
By the terms of his will the testator named Defendant independent
executrix of his estate. The testator also bequeathed his residual
estate to Defendant, one-third of which Defendant was to hold in
trust for the benefit of Plaintiff. However, the will provided
no means for ascertaining the specific interests of Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant, in her capacity as independent executrix, partitioned the residuary estate between herself and Plaintiff. Plaintiff
contended that she was not bound by this partition. Held: In the
absence of authorization under the will, an independent executor has
no power to partition the testator's estate without permission from
the court. Clark v. Posey, 329 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)
error ref. n.r.e.
Although four states authorize independent administration by
statute,' case law shows that only two of these states, viz., Texas and
Washington, actually utilize it.' Under the Texas statute a testator
may provide in his will for an executor to administer the estate independently of the probate court after the will is probated and recorded and an appraised inventory and list of claims are filed with
"Ball, supra note 20, at 227.
'Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 14-502 (1956); Idaho Code Ann., S 15-237 (1947); Tex.
Prob. Code. Ann., § 145 (1946); Wash. Rev. Code, § 11.68.010-040 (1956).
' In re Clawson's Estate, 3 Wash.2d 509, 101 P.2d 968 (1940); In re Hanson's Estate,
87 Wash. 113, 151 Pac. 264 (1915).
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the court.' An independent executor possesses power co-extensive
with that of an executor, i.e., he may do independently any act
which the executor might do pursuant to an order from the probate
court.' The independent executor may incur reasonable expenses,'
collect debts,' lend money,' and employ agents! In essence, therefore, he may do any act which the testator might have done during
his lifetime, subject to restrictions in the will of the testator."°
Where the will does not provide a means for partition of the
estate, the Texas Probate Code provides that an independent executor
may apply to the probate court for partition and distribution of
the estate, which is to be made under the direction and administration

of the court." If the independent executor does not take advantage
of this provision, the probate court has no jurisdiction over any attempted partition;" and any suit contesting a partition by the independent executor must be brought in the district court." Thus, in
the absence of authority in the will the independent executor, acting
alone, cannot make a valid partition of the estate.' The rationale
in limiting the partitioning power of the independent executor is
that he alone should not have the power to change the intended
devise of the testator from an undivided interest in the estate to a
specific portion thereof."
McDonough v. Cross was the first case to hold that the independent
executor had no power to partition a decedent's estate. The court
based its decision upon a comparison of the powers of a court appointed administrator and the fact that such a partition would have
the effect of changing the testator's will.' In the two subsequent cases
'Tex. Prob. Code Ann., § 145 (1956). Adherence in the will to the wording of the
statute will assure independent administration of the estate. Lovejoy v. Cockrell, 63
S.W.2d 1009 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
'Alexander v. Berkman, 3 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error ref.
'Lang v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 138 Tex. 399, 159 S.W.2d 478 (1942); Martin v.
Dial, 57 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933); In re Elvigen's Estate, 191 Wash. 614, 71
P.2d 672 (1937).
8 Dyer v. Winston, 77 S.W. 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
"Cases cited, note 5 supra.
' Beckhan v. Beckhan, 227 S.W. 940 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
'Dyer v. Winston, 77 S.W. 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
5
' Hutcherson v. Hutcherson, 135 S.W.2d 757, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref.;
Ware v. Barfield, 54 S.W.2d 1105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
"Tex. Prob. Code Ann., § 150 (1956); City Nat'l Bank v. Penn, 92 S.W.2d 532
(Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Parker v. Allison, 22 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
" Cocke v. Smith, 142 Tex. 396, 179 S.W.2d 954 (1944).
1 Leach v. Leach, 208 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Hutcherson v. Hutcherson, 135 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref.
"Johnson v. Short, 94 S.W. 1082 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906); McDonough v. Cross, 40
Tex. 251 (1874).
15 McDonough v. Cross, supra note 14.
8
' McDonough v. Cross, 40 Tex. 251 (1874).
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which followed the McDonough decision the courts emphasized the
fact that the independent executor was one of the devisees among
whom the property was to be partitioned." In the instant case,
although the independent executrix was a beneficiary under the
will and stood to profit by the partition, the court in no way alludes
to this factor as a basis for its decision.
The principal case may be regarded as settling the law in Texas
that an independent executor, in the absence of authority in the
will, can never partition the testator's estate. There is a valid reason
for such a rule. Other powers granted to the independent executor
merely facilitate administration while the power to partition would
be the power to change substantially the testator's will and force
the beneficiaries to accept specific property where they had held
an undivided interest. If the testator does not specificially grant this
power to his independent executor, it is logical to assume that he
did not anticipate the existence of such power and the court is
correct in disallowing it.
Joe E. Griffith

7

" Terrill v. Terrill, 189 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945)
Short, 94 S.W. 1082 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).

error ref.; Johnson v.

